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Cadacualtez, or why one is not another
Consciousness & personal identity's main feature is a philosophical concept eclipsed in natural scienceA synoptic exposition in philosophical anthropology, sketching the psychophysical nexus and the difference between life and soul in history of ideas and history of culture, this audioknol is purposed to facilitate introductory study.
Cadacualtez, or why one is not another
An audioknol
A technical concept of philosophical anthropology (the specific discipline in philosophy that methodically reflects about what a person is), cadacualtez designates the mind without consideration of its mental contents, inasmuch as unbarterable and unsubstitutable by any other mind also without consideration of its mental contents.
Table of contents
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Definitions: as noun
1. In every consciousness, existenciality, psyche, soul or mind existing in nature (i.e., not in the cognitive representation of her identity, but in its supporting ontology, whatever it be), cadacualtez designates that because of which such a psyche differs from every other psyche even before starting to differentiate itself into mental contents.
2. As a consequence, cadacualtez also designates the manifestation of the former as the constitutive determination, of each finite mind that natural science finds in nature, to both causally affect and be causally affected by no other parcel of nature - namely, such and such a brain and its bodily and outer circumstances - than the parcel that, because of this determination, acquired the status that is called her.
3. On a relations-focused angle, cadacualtez designates the particular psychosomatic or psyche-body relationship, constitutive of everyone, to sustain causal exchanges with a certain parcel of nature, rather than having one's existentiality instead eclosed in any other brain or constitutive circumstance.Simple explanation
By its denoting one's determination to sustain constitutive causal exchanges with a fixed parcel of nature, rather than one's existentiality having, instead, eclosed to any other constitutive brain or circumstance, cadacualtez is a concept somehow akin to philosopher Martin Heidegger's (1889-1976) notion of Jemeinigkeit (see below, Translations), yet differing from this. The concept of cadacualtez assumes that in nature a diversity of psyches is localized, e.g. in the organisms of the human beings, dogs, or apes - but not in mountains or pines, not either as a general subjectivity or "world soul" (a thesis that is called panpsychism, the view that all matter has consciousness). As it is widely known, the psyches, minds or existentialities found in nature differ among themselves as they develop different inner mental contents. For example, each human being learns different things, a dog or a seal is acquainted with a certain person or has learnt certain abilities while another dog or seal instead did not it, etc. There is no scientific doubt that psyches differ in regard to their mental contents. Yet, do they also differ intrinsically, before starting to distinguish knowledges, i.e. before beginning to learn? The question is important because, if they did not differ intrinsically, it would be possible to think that mind or psyche is a common material ("consciousness"), akin to water or gold, from which samples are taken that afterward adopt diverse shapes: gold may take the shape of a ring or a coin, water that of a drinking glass or a bottle, such a supposed "consciousness" that of this or that cognoscitive development - to put examples. This idea of mental contents as not inseparably belonging ("inhering") to a particular psyche, existentiality, mind or soul is reflected in a notion of "consciousness" not seldom seen in modern textbooks in English: namely, "consciousness" as a natural element, fungible like gold or water, the different samples from which are to take, along some development, different shapes.
That widely known depiction is not the single one of its kind. Another portrayal points out that psyches are cadacualtic, that is to say that they are characterized on their cadacualtez: in other words that, before to start any development, psyches already differ among themselves. Things being so, no common "mental element" would exist. Reason is, that mental contents inhere (to a particular psyche and not to another). Hence they cannot be "disengaged" out of such a particular psyche and exhibited in a non-inhering condition, such as apples or rocks on a table; and no "mind dust", after amassing itself into some conglomeration, could indifferently shape up one or another psyche, as it is thought in the views of numerous ancient thinkers, Stoic and other, William James (1842-1910), or Albert North Whitehead (1861-1947).
History of the issue
This difficult question and its derivations are better considered in historical perspective. Platonism has been portrayed as the most influential philosophy of Western culture: the mentioned philosoher Whitehead stated in 1929 thatThe safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato. I do not mean the systematic scheme of thought which scholars have doubtfully extracted from his writings. I allude to the wealth of general ideas scattered through them... " [1]
Yet Platonism, which describes everything on the basis of everlasting (or, rather, excluded from time) general Ideas, lacks means to internally distinguish a sample-individual from another, for example a dog's psyche from another independently of its knowledges and abilities. Because of this indistinguishability, under platonic influence, in the Middle Ages it was adopted the saying "de individuum scientia non datur", meaning that "about individuals it is not possible that any science exists" (understanding, as science, the platonically conceived science alone).
In 16th, 17th century, and 19th century England, the British Platonism was highly influential. In this line of thinking, John Locke (1632-1704), who on other issues expressed strong opposition to Platonism, depicted body-soul relationships as only consisting of efficient causality; namely - following the model proposed by Plato, of a helmsman and any ship that he accidentally steers - as mutually affected only like as the steerer moves the handwheel while the ship carries him aboard. There neither would or could exist any other kind of relationship. The link between a soul or psyche and her body - namely, the psychophysical nexus - would thus be purely accidental and, therefore, the mind-brain relationship would only consist in efficient causality.
Nonviable craniopagus parasiticus (a parasitic head, attached to the head of a more fully-developed fetus or infant) is one of the many forms of persons unable to attain intellectual development. The twins' respective mental contents inhere to different psyches, in turn related to different parcels of extramental nature. Such parcels (bodies, or particular bodily segments) are made of fungible, non-cadacualtic materials (see below), thus they cannot determine who is to find herself circumstanced therein rather than another. As explained in the article, the non-accidentality of the psychophysical nexus, namely the determination of a psyche to finding herself existentially eclosed at , say, the parasitic rather than at the viable twin body, as well as the unbarterability of this allocation, is to depend on the psyche's cadacualtic features.
In matter of philosophical anthropology, in this way, the possibility was left out of consideration, or became hidden from view, of an intrinsecal relationship of every psyche with the body (or metabolizing parcel of nature) in which that psyche finds itself, rather than in any other - a situation sometimes referred to as the issue of "why do I always awake behind my nose and not behind of any other nose". In Platonist o Lockean scenarios, it is not feasible to consider that (1) every psyche be different from any other even before it becomes developed into constitutive differentiations (which for Platonisms are always cognoscitive) and (2) that such a psyche could be built up with some inner, particular relationship toward a determined body (which relationship includes the historical moments and situation in which that body persists) and not toward any other. John Locke's understanding was that only such a "plug" or psyche-body accidental harnessing exists, discounting any intrnsecal connectionship or intrinsically determined psychophysical nexus.
Keeping this Lockean disregard of this possibility, David Hume (1711-1776) asserted that efficient causality does not yield any sensory impression, so that the "ungrounded" concept of efficient causality should be kept away of empirical science. It made the accidentality of the psychophysical nexus to look as even more plausible. Hume could not know that, a century and a half later, Max Planck's (1858-1947) ideas would led to an explanation of why this happens (reason is, that physical causation is discrete or by indivisible pieces or quanta, so that it wastes itself in effecting the causal change and nothing spills or wells over for aditionally causing a sensory impression of the very causal act). But Hume also declared that efficient causation not either yields a sensory impression when the very subject is who causally operates. That academic narrative grounded the reduction of psyches to their mental contents ("minds"). This became important after the Enlightenment, in the controversy against countries whose political power tapped on certain religious traditions. Yet toward 1821 Maine de Biran (1766-1824) started a critique reaction by showing that, against what Hume affirmed, causation indeed yield impressions when the very subject is the causal agent. With this, to describe the psyches as if they were only minds or collections of mental contents ceased to seem requisite, a philosophical issue that by then had acquired poltical relevance. Leaving this poltical connectionship aside, the natural science's investigation in the topic benefitted from the concept of Christfried Jakob (1866-1956) of "subjective intonations". This name appplies to sensations, but if these do intonate something, then the intonated reality is different of its intonations. This idea of the psyche as something more than its mental contents became developed, firstly by Jakob's disciples, into the notion of cadacualtez.
Audiotext section (25 minutes) Among the profoundest and most difficult topics of philosophical anthropology, this entry's subject presents special difficulty. This comes not from the words or signs, but rests in the articulation of what the philosophical concepts point to. The following segment, a more proper explanation than the introductory one offered above, may benefit by hearing its audiotext in parallel to reading it, or downloading its .mp3 file for later revision. This section is taken from Electroneurobiologia vol. 7 (2), pp. 81-116, 2000; reproduced with permission also in Helmut Wautischer, ed., Ontology of Consciousness: Percipient Action , The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass (A Bradford Book, 2008), pages 371-377.
Minds' Cadacualtic Features
The most outstanding feature of these minds is rather one that culture often eclipsed, namely every mind's cadacualtez. Cadacualtez - that is, the intrinsic singularity, unbarterability, unrepeatability, and incommunicability of every existential being (independent of its being finite or not) - has remained unperceived in many cultures, as if hidden from view. Social stratification and its reflection in the resources of the language often privileged the allusions in block, the "mass nouns" in some East Asian languages and the "De individuum scientia non datur" ("about individuals no science is given") in the presuppositions of Western science. These structural constraints also have functional roots. In humans, as well as in every animal regulated by a circumstanced existentiality, typification or conceptual generalization is the foundation and necessary condition of utilitarian praxis - be it nutcracking or sending probes to the outer planets. Because of this, in every culture such a conceptual generalization grounded intelligibility on the references to those realities whose "individual instances" might be freely swapped, one in the place of another and any one by any one else, so that their total set would make a kind of fungible mass, from which it is equivalent to take a portion or rather any other portion in order to "instantiate" such a mass. With this "samples" way of making allusion, individuality became an intersection of fungible attributes and the references to cadacualtez become eclipsed. Conceptual elements of this variety are characteristic of the line of thought that finds its continuity along intellectual stances such as those of Pythagoras, Parmenides, Plato, and British Puritanism and Platonism. Some of these conceptual elements have prevailed in the scientific way of making reference to the realities found in nature, preventing an emphasis on, or at times a perception of, the mentioned intrinsic unbarterability of existentialities. In other cases the notional developments of monotheistic faiths obscured it and, as outlined below, made its conceptual elaboration superfluous, contributing to the same result.
Minds' intrinsic unbarterability is thus a feature whose conceptualization is culturally eclipsed, as may be seen even in the communicative metaphor chosen by the unknown writer of the Book of Job's conclusion, [probably a late addition] whose author assumed natural in his readers's mindset the substitutability of some persons for others fulfilling their same role. In ancient times, in fact, no word was available to denote cadacualtez - even the term that originated our word person appeared relatively late - and the recognition of cadacualtez was often reduced to a preconceptual understanding of "lo que se cifra en el nombre" ("what is ciphered, or encoded, in the name"). It was manifested as an inexpressible intuition indicated by every forename, helped by place-names or family names wherever forenames seemed insufficiently clear - for example, to distinguish absent Gilles of Rome from absent Gilles of Lessines. Yet the eclipsing also affected the conceptual fathoming of somatopsychical or body-mind relationships.
Such a line of culturally dominant thinking abstracted and subtracted from the concept of every psyche the element of its unbarterable existentiality, representing every mind as consisting only of its mental contents: a hypothetical mind that happened to differentiate the same mental contents as another, would be deemed to be the latter. This confusion of the mind's presence within reality and her mental contents' structure, viewing the being or enaction of a cadacualtez - which makes an existentiality to exist - as exhausted in the arrangement of features later acquired by the already existing existentiality (rather than by another), made Locke's view, of body-mind relationships as exclusively consisting of efficient causality, appear "logical" and natural. Just as a domestic appliance that might remain connected or disconnected with the mains, and if plugged in might remain so in a certain wall plug or, indifferently, in any other whatsoever, such a brain-mind or body-mind relationship was also considered to exist only as long as it was working (e.g. while originating mental contents or bodily motions) and the connection was assumed to be Platonically accidental - that is, an extrinsic harnessing together, as if empsycheable bodies and embody-able minds lacked any intrinsic bond referring them one to another individually: as if existentialities might be causally chained or "plugged in" to whatever parcel of nature, in the style of Mark Twain's "The Prince and the Beggar." So conceived, existentialities are no longer recognized as cadacualtic, brains are believed to be capable of producing them (because what is called "psyche" has been reduced to its acquired mental contents, some of which - namely, the new sensations - indeed are interactively generated by the brain organ) and minds, in good logic, are believed to be clonable.
Such a description is certainly improper to describe what is found as existentialities, but it may be proper to philosophically describe their common ontic constitution. In the Peripatetic line of thought, for example, Scholastic analyses came to depict a hylemorphic constitution that abstracted the unbarterability of existentialities by using a notion that has been called a "standard cadacualtez" - that is, a nomical or typical cadacualtez which, of course, is uncadacualtic. This process attracted some confusion regarding the Aristotelian series of souls (only vegetative soul, vegetative-sensitive soul, and vegetative-sensitive-rational soul, collectively composing a segment of the Great Chain of Being that once did represent, crudely yet to the best of human knowledge, nervous systems' evolution and the evolutionary sequence of the functions of relation) and the insertion of cadacualtic existentialities in such a series.
Aristotle conceived knowing, gnoen, as a variety of metabolic assimilation only for the purpose, and with the precise objective, of being able to compose a unique descriptive series with which to delineate the full variety of living beings - by comparing species among themselves and comparing the developmental sequences of individuals. With this conceptual tool, Aristotle was able to achieve his purpose, of attaining conceptual means suitable for unifiedly and uniformly describing the living beings found in nature in all their possible forms. His informational view of knowledge, presenting it as a variety of metabolic assimilation, is thus why Aristotle managed to institute biology as a unified science. In this way Peripatetism and the whole of European culture found a coherent exposition of a sector of reality, the living beings. Scholasticism then procured the goal of extending this exposition to the whole of reality, establishing a description of every type of reality in ontological terms. When Christian Peripatetism paid descriptive attention to psyches or individual existentialities, its purpose was to depict their ontical constitution, which it accordingly did not do in cadacualtic but in fungible terms, as Matter, Form, and their instances are. Its pre-Renaissance ideas permeated most scientific descriptions during Modernity, even those of its ideological opponents.
Therefore, Christian Peripatetism, in order to account for the constitution of every individual, sensibly considered as its formal cause the matter signed by quantity. This name denotes the piece or particular portion of fungible prime matter that, while accidentally composing the individual of the case, after successive information by the Forms of the system's components finally assumes the Form proper of its species or Type.
For Aristotle, in view of his mentioned purpose, it was uninteresting to detect if within the series of organisms animated by a vegetative-sensitive soul the individuals of some species included an existentiality circumstanced to sense and move its body. This is the case of a dog, for instance. Other organisms lack such an existentiality in charge of biological functions, for example a starfish - or its common ancestors with the dog, if Aristotle could have paid attention to them. These other organisms are constituted purely in the hylozoic hiatus and operate in a purely reactive way: they are unable to inaugurate innovative causal series semoviently, that is to say with decisions. In addition, they cannot bring to an end an outer causal series and know its last effect as a sensory intonation of existential being. As mentioned, the ontic consistency of gnoseological apprehension or knowledge requires a break in the efficient causal series, and these unempsyched animals are entirely constituted in the hylozoic hiatus where all efficient causality is unbrokenly transeunt. These animals lack any intrinsically unbarterable element, and thus any knowledge inasmuch as experience: in these animal species having an Aristotelian soul but not circumstancing an existentiality, their "knowledge" is mere information, gnoseologically uncharacterized - and only metaphorically called "knowledge" by external observers interested in keeping Aristotelian homogeneity for the biological series.
The influential philosophy of Christian Peripatetism, with its affiliation to monotheistic hopes, found it pointless to refine the ontological principle of individuation in order to describe what is ciphered in the name, or cadacualtez. It was a feature eclipsed by culture's generalizations but assured by the "Good News" - that is, by the dogmatic perception of the ultimate ground of reality as Lover. Christian anthropology is monist - in no way dualist, as it is often erroneously believed to be on the basis of Platonic notions imparted by its Cartesian misrepresentation - inasmuch as the reciprocal unbarterability of the two "elements" compounding the somatopsychical personal unity grounds the dogma of the Creator's individual reference to every soul when creating it for a certain body and circumstance.
It thus was superfluous for Christian Peripatetism to require from materia signata quantitate the impossibility of justifying nomically the anomical reason why one is not forming one's psychophysical unity with another body, that is, why one is not circumstanced to interact with time processes from a different corporality - the body being the outer signal that, because of the unbarterability of circumstantiation, indicates a different cadacualtez. This found fact is not a nomical fact nor can it be conceptualized as such, either in our current description of reality or in the doctrinary beliefs taken for granted by Christian Peripatetism. For sure some Scholastics might have confused the two elements of hylemorphic constitution, from whose concept is absent any intrinsic need requiring an unbarterable relationship with a single and particular instance of the other species, with body and existentiality, which are found to comprise it. Yet other authors found it futile and redundant to analyze and explain, in regular or nomical terms, what their faith manifested to them as a most singular loving act of the ultimate ground. All the more so because, on reason of their faith, they chose to focus on the communicable and mystagogic aspects of the existential finding, thereby contributing to the cultural eclipse of cadacualtez. This is why it was only rarely and recently noticed that the cerebral organ only determines some sensory contents of her or his experience, but does not determine - nor could it do this - who will appear circumstanced to use it; namely, the not nomical (i.e., not standard) but cadacualtic and unbarterable constitution of a certain psychophysical unity.
This neglect was further bolstered by the time asymmetry of cadacualtic descriptions. Cadacualtez is postdictable but never predictable. If one's survey goes back from the existence of a particular existentiality, say that of Jane Doe, to her previous nonexistence, the former is already established as a part of the query. In contrast, when the survey is conceptualized in the opposite sense, one comes from the nonexistence therein - say, in a not yet fecundated ovule - of circumstancing relationships with any cadacualtic existentiality (namely, not from the nonexistence of circumstancing relationships with Jane Doe but the nonexistence of circumstancing relationships with any existentiality by then future) to the existence of Jane Doe's particular reality, not another. In this fashion, in one avenue of the survey (the latter, or causal sequence) this nonalterity differs from identity, but merges with it in the other, sequence-reversing avenue. The epistemological time asymmetry that in this way comes to affect the issue cloaks, habitually, the important distinction between one's being one because of one's history, namely the fact that the sequence of constitutive events makes one's instanceable features, and one's being not another because of a different source. In this regard cadacualtez is a converse of ipseity, the latter determining one to be oneself and the former making one's being not another.
Cadacualtez, the intrinsic unbarterability, unrepeatability, incommunicability, and singularity of every existential being, thus manifests as the ontic determination, in nature, of every event of a finite observer's finding herself experiencing in a circumstance rather than, instead, in another. Natural science finds psychisms that neither self-posit to exist nor self-circumstance to eclose. As their circumstancing is a constitutive contingency for finite observers, its unbarterability makes such event one and the same, even if iterated observationally over the years - one never being shifted or teleported to other bodily circumstances. As a matter of observation, each real observer in nature cannot derive its own place from the physical regularities forming its other empirical findings; less, to account for why the availabilities compounding his or her mental world do not become available to another person. Certainly, this other in lieu of, say, the reader, could not detect any swapping, since as mentioned cadacualtez, although never predictable, is always postdictable; but before it happens (i.e., now), "other in one's lieu" is fully understandable to everyone, and serves here to illustrate what the pronoun who signifies: namely, what is ciphered in the name. The variable indicated in "other in one's lieu" is what the personal identity means, alluded to in the function word who; cadacualtez is the ontic determination of each instance of its being brought to bear. And before a particular existentiality ecloses to nonpredicative actuality, as a subset of finitude among a plurality of separated psychisms, the physical constitution does not suffice to determine "who" shall avail of the availabilities of a psychism. For example, at the time of the physical constitution of the reader's body, the components in the maternal makeup and paternal spermatozoid that originally composed such a body did not suffice to determine (or even refer to) "who" was to avail of the reader's apprehension, semovience, and historical-biophysical circumstances including the species-specific palette of structureless characterizations stirred by her brain's states - rather than the states of, say, a reptile brain - and the remaining of the reader's body providing its own time acuity for her existentiality to directly apprehend some bodily constituents. The particular set of all these availabilities, which an existential finitude - say, the present reader's - does not posit but encounters, is not available to another finite semovient existentiality. Cadacualtez, a converse of ipseity manifested as the eclosional circumstancing of finite noeseis, which in each case makes 'their' some respective noema causing each finite psychism's circumstancing to not an other brain, is thus intrinsically asymmetrical over time[1].
Although this asymmetry is conspicuous, its appreciation is not helped by the cultural occultation of cadacualtez. The conceptual situation is even worsened by the quite widespread misunderstanding of actuality as if it were predicative - presenting 'to be' as it were a result of combining features, or predicates. As an example one might think of the "proof of the existence of God" by Anselm, archbishop of Canterbury from 1093 to 1109 ("God exists because one of his attributes is being perfect and he could not be perfect if he would not exist"), or the conception of mind as a software that by arranging nonexperienced contraptions generates experience (not seldom inconsistently conceived as a "nonpersonal personhood" consisting only of "unowned mental contents, " so as to apply Locke's account of brain-mind relationships as a mind-generative efficiency harnessing together the organic source and its product); or the so-called bootstrapping cosmogonies. This confusion, commonplace today and probably also among the Sophists in classical Greece, is an old neglect of 'being' as enaction of a presence in the reality. 'Being' is not a result of such presence's features, and such a confusion between presence and description becomes crucial in the portrayal of cadacualtic realities. In this regard, because the logic of concepts asserts that being one is identical to being not another, the cultural eclipse of cadacualtez was reinforced, and its recognition looks as if it depended on its being generalized - thus requiring the annihilation of the denotative aptitude of its concept in order to use it.
Deconstructing this composite cloaking, or eclipsing series of circumstances, demands heeding both that 'to be' is really different from a combination of predicates and also the mentioned time asymmetry. In macroscopic affairs time is just an accidental occurrence, which comes from the differential acquisition of inertial mass by elementary "particles." It is convenient now to cast a glance on this topic. Macroscopic time process, as well as spatiality or dispersivity for forces, are secondary, derivative cosmological occurrences. /.../
Above: a neuroscience student in Buenos Aires, as a part of her formation, mulls over the difference between life and soul while facing the corpse(s) of Flavia and Xanthe, twin sisters, respectfully preserved for teaching at the author's laboratory. Their bodily separation, being only cephalic (a variety of xyphodymy), furnished immediate extramental circumstances to two different existentialities, which fulfilled the uppermost regulatory roles of a single living organism. Aristotle taught that mental contents and extramental realities (e.g., a sensation, and an apple) differ in that the latter can stand alone while the former ought to be of a certain psyche or rather of another psyche, but cannot stand alone like apples. This distinction is lost from view in the Platonisms' (or, more accurately, the Pythagoric-Parmenidean-Platonic-Puritan line of thought's) out-look of nature. The notion is rather conserved in Christfried Jakob's (1866-1956) concept of intonation, whereby e.g. each of two simultaneous colors or pains ought to be a sensory intonation of a certain existentiality - and thus, even if the two members of a pair could be said to be sensorially identical, they would differ if one is, say, Flavia's red and, the other, Xanthe's red. Below: dicephalic parapagus conjoined twins, playing. The question, Why Left found herself at the left head rather than at the right one, is as valid in these cases as in separated people and pregnancies.
Translations
As a technical philosophical term, utilized in studies of personal identity and brain-psyche (or brain-mind) relationships, and a natural-science term (utilized specially in electroneurobiology) cadacualtez is employed without modification in English, Basque, Catalan, Dutch, Finnish, Greek, Guarani, Japanese, Latin, Polish, Russian, Spanish and Swedish. In German, philosopher Martin Heidegger used Jemeinigkeit for a different but cognate concept (which Indian philosopher J.L. Mehta ( ("The Phil. of MH", Banaras Hindu Univ. Press, 1967)) rendered in English as my-own-owness, and Jos Gaos (translation of "Sein u. Zeit" into Spanish, FCE, Mxico, 1951) as "lo en cada caso 'mo' ". Jemeinigkeit refers to a phenomenal worldview while cadacualtez rather refers to a transphenomenal or ontic denotatum). It may be noted that Gaos translation of Jemeinigkeit into Spanish as well as its Arabic form employed, e.g., by A. Courban [3], i.e. the technicism ananafsi ("ana-nafs-i": from ana = me, nafs = soul or intimacy's beingness + i = possesive case suffix), specially denote that because of which one is oneself, whereas cadacualtez rather emphasizes that because of which one is not another.
Derived
cadacualtic (adj.)
Etymology
From Sp. cada cual, each one, plus an added end meaning -hood
Bibliography
The treatments use to be inserted in expositions of larger related topics, e.g.
- M. Crocco, Alma de reptil!, Electroneurobiologa 2004; 12 (1), pp. 1-72.
- ib., A Palindrome: Conscious Living Creatures as Instruments of Nature; Nature as an Instrument of Conscious Living Creatures, Electroneurobiologa vol. 7 (2), pp. 81-116, 2000 (wherefrom the above audio is taken).
Some historic aspects are commented in
- M. Szirko, Por qu en relatividad el tiempo depende del marco de referencia?, Electroneurobiologa vol. 13 (3), pp. 238-244, 2005.
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